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RECENT DECISIONS 
BILLS AND NoTES-lNDORSEMENTS-EFFECT OF CONTEMPORANEOUS AGREE· 
MENTON THE lNDORSEMENT CONTRACT-Plaintiff, payee of a promissory note, 
indorsed and negotiated the note to the defendant bank. Attached to the 
note was a separate agreement of assignment and warranty in which the 
plaintiff assigned the note and a conditional sales contract to defendant, 
and further agreed to repurchase the note if any of the warranties in the 
contemporaneous agreement were breached. The maker of the note default-
ed and defendant, after due presentment and notice, debited plaintiff's ac-
count for the face amount of the note. Plaintiff brought suit to recover the 
money from defendant on the theory that the contemporaneous agreement 
had qualified the general indorsement contract implied by statute from his 
signature on the note.1 The trial court held that the plaintiff was an un-
qualified indorser and gave judgment for defendant. On appeal, held, 
affirmed. While the indorsement of the note and the contemporaneous 
agreement should be construed as one contract, the language of assignment 
in the contemporaneous agreement is not sufficient to make plaintiff a 
qualified indorser.2 Allison Ford Sales v. Farmers State Bank, (Iowa 1957) 
86 N .W. (2d) 896. 
The general rule of contract law, that contemporaneous instruments 
which relate to the same transaction will be construed as a single contract,8 
has often forced the question whether a bill or note is rendered non-nego-
tiable by a separate agreement such as a mortgage or conditional sales 
contract.4 There are, however, very few cases dealing with the effect of the 
contemporaneous instrument rule on the general indorsement contract 
1 The separate agreement read in part: "For value received, the undersigned hereby 
sells, assigns and transfers • . . the note herein referred to." This langnage was relied 
on by plaintiff as a qualification of his special indorsement on the note. He contended 
that the words of assignment were similiar to the words "without recourse" which under 
Iowa Code (1954) §541.38 (NIL, §38) would be a qualified indorsement. He also contended 
that the specific assumption of the assignor's liability in the contemporaneous agreement 
negated the general indorser's liability imposed by statute under Iowa Code (1954) §541.63 
(NIL, §63). 
2 The court quite properly follows the better view in holding that words of assign-
ment (even when written on the back of a note) do not create a qualified indorsement, 
nor do they relieve the indorser from the statutory liabilities of a general indorser under 
Iowa Code (1954) §541.66 (NIL, §66). For a general ,background and discussion of this 
branch of the case, see Fay v. Witte, 262 N.Y. 215, 186 N.E. 678 (1933). See also BRITION, 
BILLS AND NOTES §58 (1943); Arant, "The Written Aspect of Indorsement," 34 YALE L. J. 
144 (1924). 
3 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §628 (1936). 
4 The better view is that a negotiable instrument and a cpntemporaneous agreement 
will not be construed as one contract unless the bill or note requires one to look at the 
separate agreement to determine its terms, in which event the bill or note is rendered 
non-negotiable. Enoch v. Brandon, 249 N.Y. 263, 164 N.E. 45 (1928). See generally Aigler, 
"Conditions in Bills and Notes," 26 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1928). 
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implied by statute from a blank or special indorsement on a bill or note.5 
The courts which have decided the point assume that the contemporaneous 
agreement should be construed as part of the indorsement contract.6 Thus 
if the indorser signs a note in blank, but in a contemporaneous agreement 
assigns to the indorsee without recourse, he will be deemed a qualified 
indorser despite his blank indorsement on the back of the note.7 The 
courts have used caution in applying this rule by insisting that the con-
temporaneous agreement must contain definite language which clearly 
indicates that the indorsement on the note is to be modified.8 Thus phrases 
in contemporaneous agreements such as "we sign the note for the security 
of money,"9 and "this (note) is given as a full settlement of the claim,"10 
have been held not to qualify the indorsement contract. The court in the 
principal case, by holding that words of assignment in a contemporaneous 
instrument do n_ot qualify the indorsement contract, displays the caution 
found in these cases. It is also generally held that the contemporaneous 
agreement cannot protect the indorser from unqualified indorsement liabil-
ity against the holder in due course who has no knowledge of the separate 
agreement.11 A few courts have held that a contemporaneous agreement 
will not vary the legal import of the indorsement when there is specific 
writing on the note which shows the type of indorsement contract that the 
indorser intended.12 Although these fatter decisions are of little value in 
the great majority of cases because most indorsements do not spell out 
their legal effect, they do show a slight judicial dissatisfaction with the 
contemporaneous instrument rule in the setting of the indorsement con-
tract.18 It seems somewhat anomalous that it is generally held that a con-
5 The indorsement contract implied by the statute is that an indorser of a negotiable 
instrument engages to pay the holder if the maker or acceptor defaults and due present-
ment, notice and protest are properly given. NIL, §66. 
6 Davis v. Brown, 94 U.S. 423 (1876), is the leading American case for the rule that 
contemporaneous agreements can modify the indorsement contract. The courts have 
generally followed this rule since the enactment of the NIL. See Gillett v. Flora, 68 Colo. 
218, 187 P. 527 (1920); Blackwood v. Sakwinski, 221 Mich. 464, 191 N.W. 207 (1922); Title 
Insurance & Trust Co. v. Bandini, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 157, 79 P. (2d) 141 (1938); Home 
State Bank of Russell v. Milberger, 146 Kan. 541, 72 P. (2d) 1004 (1937). 
7 Although most of the cases in this area involve qualified indorsements, it has been 
held that a contemporaneous agreement can render indorsements conditional as well as 
qualified. See Richmond Postal Credit Union v. Booker, 170 Va. 129, 195 S.E. 663 (1938). 
s Crilly v. Gallice, (3d Cir. 1906) 148 F. 835; Byers v. Appleman, 50 Ohio App. 135, 
197 N.E. 595 (1935). 
9 First Nat. Bank of Louisville v. Bickel, 154 Ky. 11, 156 S.W. 859 (1913). 
10 Byers v. Appleman, note 8 supra. 
11 Wood v. Ferguson, 71 Mont. 540, 230 P. 592 (1924); Davis v. Brown, note 6 supra. 
12 See Hawkeye Securities Fire Ins. Co. v. Central Trust of Des Moines, 208 Iowa 
573, 221 N.W. 486 (1929); Central State Bank of Dallas v. First State Bank of Abilene, 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925) 276 S.W. 941. 
13 Several other courts have also indicated some dissatisfaction with the contempora-
neous instrument rule as applied to indorsement contracts. See Jones v. Commercial 
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temporaneous agreement will be read as part of the indorsement contract 
when the majority of the courts refuse to read the conditions of a con-
temporaneous agreement into the body of a negotiable instrument.14 This 
majority rule is based on the sound theory that the terms of a negotiable 
instrument are unconditional promises or orders found on the face of the 
bill or note; therefore, if contemporaneous instruments were read as one 
contract with the body of the bill or note, negotiability would usually 
be destroyed.15 When, however, a contemporaneous agreement is read as 
part of the indorsement contract it will usually merely qualify the indorse-
ment rather than destroy negotiability.16 Thus since the strong policy in 
favor of negotiability does not work against the contemporaneous instru-
ment rule in the setting of indorsement contracts, the courts have not felt 
a need to object to the application of this' contract rule to ind~rsements. 
It is submitted, however, that it would be more in keeping with the con-
cept of integrity of negotiable instruments not to apply the contempora-
neous instrument rule even to indorsement contracts. The indorsement 
contract fixed by statute is an integral part of a negotiable instrument and 
should not be construed according to a general rule of contract law.17 From 
a practical viewpoint, the main advantage of this approach would be in 
avoiding problems, like the one in the principal case, of determining 
whether ambiguous words used in the contemporaneous agreement are 
sufficiently technical to qualify the indorsement even if they had been 
used on the note instead of in the separate instrument.18 The separate 
agreement might still be used solely as a defense in a suit between the 
immediate parties, but not as a modification of the indorsement contract. 
If the separate agreement were used solely in defense there would only 
be the question of whether the parties clearly intended to relieve the in-
dorser from his liability on the note, instead of the current practice of 
changing the import of the indorsement contract according to the tenor 
of the language in the contemporaneous agreement. 
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Credit Co., 52 Ga. App. 796, 184 S.E. 652 (1936); Byers v. Appleman, note 8 supra; and 
Crilly v. Gallice, note 8 supra. 
14 See note 4 supra. 
15 BRITION, BILLS AND NOTES §15 (1943). 
16 NIL, §38 provides that a bill or note is still negotiable even when it has been 
qualifiedly indorsed. In Lutz v. Matheny, 208 Ill. App. 40 (1917), the court held that a 
contemporaneous agreement could modify the indorsement contract, but it could not 
reduce the indorser's liability to less than that of a qualified indorser. 
17 The principal case takes note of the strong statutory implication in favor of the 
unqualified indorsement contract, but still applies the contemporaneous instrument rule. 
18 See note 2 supra for a discussion of the effect of words of assignment on the 
indorsement contract. 
